The Thorny Road Ahead

Rampant inflation, the burden of faltering state-controlled enterprises, the growth of Moslem fundamentalism and Kurdish separatism, and the quest for a new role after the collapse of the Soviet Union, are only some of the problems facing Turkey in the post-Soviet Union era.



Most recent figures indicate an annual inflation rate of 60 to 70 percent and an ever-increasing gap in the per capita Gross National Product (GNP) from one region of the country to the other.



"The economic disparity is one of the roots of social unrest in the world, and Turkey is not an exception. While the annual GNP in the Istanbul area is $7,000, it is under $150 in Mush, which is a hotbed of Kurdish nationalists," an official at the prestigious BIAR research center said.



Economists blame part of the problem on the existing structure of government monopolies and the inherent neglect of vast regions of the country by various administrations since the turn of the century.



They say state-controlled companies are a heavy burden on the economy with a loss of 1.5 billion dollars a year.



In a bid to alleviate some of the nation's economic problems, Turkish banks and businesses have led the way into Azerbaijan and Central Asia. About 60 Turkish companies have bought into factories or set up offices there in the past 12 months. Another 150 have established trading links.



But despite initial expectations, Turkey's trade with its ethnic cousins is still minimal. Total exports of $183 million and imports of $88 million were just one per cent of Turkey's trade in 1992, dominated as usual by business with the European Community.



One explanation for this slow growth, western analysts say, is the prevailing mood of mutual mistrust between Turks and their Turkic "brothers." "You should count your fingers after shaking hands with an Azeri. They are just not trustworthy. On the other hand, Turks sometimes assume a patronizing attitude which could be just as damaging to bilateral relations," a western diplomat said.



The economic jigsaw, taken in conjunction with the Kurdish problem and the spread of Moslem fundamentalism, constitute a real threat to internal stability and the delicate balance of power between the Turkish military and civilian leadership. "Poverty often triggers social unrest, and the Kurds are poor and can easily be exploited," a western analyst said.



Turkish officials are careful in expressing their thoughts in public on these thorny issues, but political activists and intellectuals agree that the potential dangers of religious and ethnic tension to national cohesion are far greater than anyone admits.



"Suppression of religious fanaticism in the early years of the Republic is backfiring ... Moslem fundamentalism is spreading in Turkey, and sometimes at an alarming rate," Mahmut Tali Ongoren, the Secretary General of the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, said in a recent interview. "As for the Kurdish question, if that too is not resolved, the whole democratic process in Turkey will be in deep danger," the soft-spoken Columbia University educated former journalist said. "Both of these problems are like the early stages of cancer. They do not necessarily have to be terminal, provided they are properly treated," he said.



But government reluctance to face both issues head on is not only aggravating matters, but also opening the country to further social, political and military complications, analysts say.



On the Kurdish question, the government in Ankara has constantly turned away from the issue of self-determination for the country's largest minority of ten million Kurds. The Kurds complain against cultural and ethnic restrictions and what they see as an obsession by the central government to block any move toward self-determination. "You might be able to discuss the Kurdish question with some moderates in the Turkish government, but stay away from the phrase self-determination for the Kurds. That is taboo," a western diplomat said.



This taboo also explains why Turkey is unwilling to look at the Nagorno Karabakh conflict from the perspective of self-determination for the region's majority ethnic Armenian population. "Ankara does not want to open a bag of worms. If they go along with the Armenians in Nagorno Karabakh, then they have to apply the same yardstick in their relations with the Kurds, and that is not even a distinct possibility," another diplomat said.



Meanwhile, Kurdish guerrillas launch daily attacks on Turkish civilian and military targets, and the trend is towards escalating bloodshed, further oppression and greater regional complications. If the Kurdish problem is in the forefront of Turkey's problems, the rise of Moslem fundamentalism is not that far behind.



Ironically, it is the government in Ankara that has made the rejuvenation of religion possible. Thousands of mosques have been built in Ankara, Istanbul and other major Turkish cities in recent years. " The construction of mosques is a booming industry ... and it is not based on need, but rather a natural outburst against secularism," a university professor said.



"How can the government ban the construction of a Moslem place of worship. Turkey is a secular state, but 98 percent of the population are not atheists. The people might not be religious, but they are Sunni Moslems whether the government admits it or not. No one has been able to fight religion, and Turkey is no exception. Turkey cannot ignore Islam as a powerful force or the Kurds as a continuing threat to the very fabric of the state. Both of these problems have no imminent solutions," he added.



The need to check potential dangers from religious fanatics and Kurdish guerrillas often triggers military action which in turn backfires in the form of charges of human rights violations - a sore point in Turkey's efforts to "sell" itself as a modern, secular, and democratic state.



It is this state of affairs - a tarnished human right's record, the wide gap in the GNP between the various Turkish regions, and the on-and-off war with Kurdish separatists - that has held back Turkey's acceptance as a full member in the European Community (EC).



Turkey first applied for EC membership in 1959, and made a formal bid for full integration in 1987. Despite a series of structural changes and reforms to bring the Turkish economy to a level similar to that of the EC, the best Turkey has been able to achieve is an associate status and a confirmation of her eligibility.



In one of its most recent statements on the Turkish application, the EC reiterated Turkey's importance to the present European situation, but called for continued discussions, "including a political dialogue at the highest level," before a final decision can be taken.



"This was the EC's way of saying Turkey is not ready for full membership, which is becoming something of an elusive dream. The political dialogue Europe wants is in great part on Turkey's poor human rights record involving not only the Kurds, but also its own opposition groups. The Turkish government understands this, and therefore improving its image is very important." a western diplomat commented recently.



"The road ahead for Turkey is not an easy one, and the ride is getting bumpier every day," he added.