Armenia is witnessing its deepest church-state rupture since its independence. The clash between His Holiness Karekin II, Supreme Patriarch and Catholicos of All Armenians, the spiritual head of the Armenian Apostolic Church, and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, leader of Armenia’s post-Velvet Revolution government, has unfolded over years of diverging worldviews. This has culminated in criminal prosecutions, accusations of clergy misconduct, threat of unseating the Catholicos and a broader struggle over who claims to define Armenia’s moral and national identity.
At the root of the conflict are fundamentally divergent ideologies. The Catholicos believes that members of the clergy, like all citizens, have the right and duty to express their opinions on issues of national interest, while the Prime Minister asserts that the Church takes care of spiritual matters, without expressing opinions concerning decisions and policies determined by the State.
Though cracks between the two institutions had been formed before the crushing defeat in the 44-Day War, this ideological split sharpened in its aftermath. While the Church offered emotional refuge and symbolic continuity as thousands of families mourned fallen soldiers, the government was focused on the geopolitical implications of the defeat and looked to preserve the standing of Armenia’s autonomous borders and security. Nevertheless, the profound loss of life meant intense emotional reactions, blame gaming and demands for accountability from all corners.
Mounting Tensions
In the spring of 2018, then R.A. President Serzh Sargsyan was elected Prime Minister, thus extending his power after serving his term. The people of Armenia resisted with mass protests, with opposition leader Nikol Pashinyan at the helm of what came to be called the Velvet Revolution. During the protests, the Catholicos, the Supreme Spiritual Council, and the Bishops’ Synod released multiple statements calling for a peaceful resolution. Upon the resignation of Sargsyan, Catholicos Karekin II met with Pashinyan, along with the presidents of Armenia and Artsakh, as well as senior members of the ruling party. It was a sign of progress and hope for a new landscape in Armenian democracy.
However, less than a year later, Pashinyan’s government took steps to remove Armenian Church history as a compulsory subject taught by clergy, folding certain subjects into a broader Armenian Studies course in public school curricula. The courses were first introduced in 2002 and were viewed by the Holy See as a critical means to inform youth about the integral role of the Church in the history of the Armenian people. By contrast, some viewed the course as going against the constitutional division of Church and State. That same year, the government announced intentions to apply new measures challenging the tax-exempt status of the Church, imposing levies on the revenues of the Church, including the sale of candles and donations received. In addition, the government removed two security agents traditionally assigned to the Catholicos during his visits to the dioceses in Armenia. An atmosphere of distrust began to permeate the relationship between the Mother See and the ruling party.
In April 2020, His Holiness appealed to the government on humanitarian grounds for the temporary release of former R.A. President Robert Kocharyan, who was in pre-trial detention, citing health concerns and the outbreak of Covid-19. Prime Minister Pashinyan responded with assertions tying the Catholicos to oligarchs and the former government, implying that Karekin II was trying to thwart Pashinyan’s aim to strip Armenia of the normalized corruption of the old regime. These points and counter points were interrupted by the 44-Day War in 2020.
After the devastating defeat in November 2020, with the loss of thousands of young soldiers, public outcry was at an all-time high with protests and violence flooding the streets in Armenia. At first the Catholicos called for calm, condemning violence and underscoring the importance of unity. Within weeks, as national political parties and Diaspora institutions, including the Great House of Cilicia, demanded transparency in the ceasefire negotiations and ultimately the resignation of the Prime Minister, the Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin aligned itself with this messaging.
In the five years that followed, actions and rhetoric continued to spiral. Gov-ernment officials accused clerics of crossing the line with partisan activism, alleging the pressuring of election outcomes and staging protests. By the time the Armenians of Artsakh were forced from their homeland in 2023, the position of the Church was made clear: it publicly opposed Prime Minister Pashinyan for his handling of the peace process and failing to address the right of return of the Artsakh people and political prisoners at peace negotiations, and ceding four Armenian border villages contested by Azerbaijan. Certain members of the clergy led a public outcry with protests, seeing themselves as shepherds protecting their flock; the government alleged that these clergymen were directed by His Holiness to incite a coup by coercing protestors, presenting a threat to national security.
Eventually, both sides would refrain from joint appearances, leading national remembrance events independently. No longer were the State and the Church collaborating even for moral and culturally significant public events. Many Church supporters asserted the right of the members of the clergy to enjoy freedom of speech as guaranteed by the Constitution, while the government considered this an intrusion on the political life of the country.
When PM Pashinyan publicly demanded Karekin II’s resignation in June 2025, alleging corruption and misconduct within the ranks of the Church, the symbolic stakes became immense. It was the first time since medieval times that an Armenian ruling party sought to unseat the Catholicos, an office tracing back to the 4th century A.D. , whereby worldwide representatives of the Armenian church, including clergy and laypersons, would hold elections. Detractors believed this was motivated by political considerations and made efforts to prevent possible interference by the Church in the upcoming 2026 elections.
Political Drivers
In the aftermath of the 44-Day War and loss of Artsakh, Pashinyan’s peace negotiations with Azerbaijan and Turkey were both praised and criticized. The government’s overall position has been to minimize ties with Russia and reduce the influence of pro-Russian politicians and businessmen in Armenia in favor of potential peace with the surrounding Turkic nations and deepening dialogue with the Western powers.
At the same time, the current government in Yerevan has portrayed the Armenian Church as an ally of Russia, acting as a tool of Russian interests keen on destabilizing the country and subverting its pivot to the West. There has been no evidence offered to support this, and the Church has rejected and denied such allegations as politically motivated. The Armenian Church, through the Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin, maintains dioceses and relationships with communities in all parts of the world, including both in the United States and Russia, and official visits of the Catholicos are a longstanding tradition to maintain connections.
The Current Standoff
As of November 2025, both sides appear entrenched. Karekin II continues his duties at Etchmiadzin, resisting any attempts by the government to interfere in the Church’s affairs by asserting the centuries-old independent self-governance of the Church. Pashinyan’s office has not taken any formal action but has persisted through continuous public statements and announcements, such as his intent to remove the Catholicos from office, conducting investigations and audits of Church finances, and threatening to close Holy Etchmiadzin’s long-standing Shoghakat television channel. Pashinyan has repeatedly called on churchgoers to help “liberate the Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin.” He also outlined a process to establish a coordinating council of loyal followers to remove the Catholicos and “take practical steps to free the Catholicosate and organize new elections,” despite longstanding Church governance practices.
By mid-November 2025, high-ranking clergy, and primates of the Tavush, Shirak, and Aragatsotn regions, had been detained. Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan and Archbishop Mikael Ajapahyan were arrested earlier in the summer for spearheading political activism amongst clergymen, with the former charged with scheming to overthrow the government. Bishop Mkrtich Proshyan was arrested in October 2025, accused of coercing individuals to participate in anti-government protests. In addition, close to 20 clergymen have been detained for questioning or placed under house arrest following investigations and claims of misconduct amongst the Catholicos’ inner circle. Karekin II’s brother and nephew were also charged with election interference.
To support its claims and arrests, the government has released secret recordings by the National Security Agency dating back a few years. The Church and its supporters assert that the recordings have been doctored and raise concerns about personal privacy. For a number of Sundays, the Prime Minister has been attending services celebrated by a defrocked clergyman, against the rules of the Armenian Church, and has declared he would attend church services each week with celebrants who intentionally omit the name of the Catholicos during the service.
On November 6, 2025, the Prime Minister declared at a press conference that the Church “has no legitimate Catholicos” and repeated accusations of misconduct against Karekin II. He went further to declare that he will form a committee to determine a new Catholicos, a move that oversteps the canons of the Armenian Apostolic Church and its centuries-long self-governance with a global network of diocesan assemblies that are the official bodies with the sole authority to elect or unseat a Catholicos.
International mediators—including representatives from the Vatican and the Ecumenical Patriarchate—have quietly encouraged bilateral dialogue to no avail, with neither side showing signs of compromise. Some outside observers agree that without a formal mechanism for state-church arbitration, the conflict risks normalizing permanent dual sovereignty over Armenia’s spiritual life.
Divide from Within
By the end of November 2025, tensions intensified, this time with a small group of dissenters within the church aligning themselves with the government.
On November 20, Pashinyan noted at a press conference that the “liberating” of the Mother See of Holy Etchmiatzin has begun and will inevitably reach its goal. A few days later, on November 26, a group of 13 archbishops and bishops released a statement accusing the Catholicos of covering up the misconduct of fellow Archbishop Arshak Khachatryan, after video footage surfaced of him breaking his vow of celibacy. The statement was shared on the Facebook page of Arayik Harutyunyan, the head of the Prime Minister’s Office.
The Bishops’ statement asserts that the Catholicos’ inaction against Khachatryan “harms the Church’s authority, despite repeated formal attempts by the commission and bishops to draw the Catholicos’s attention to the matter.” It goes on to further declare that His Holiness is not leading the Church according to doctrine, to which the Mother See responded in an official statement, saying that any disciplinary action, if warranted, was at its own discretion. The same day as the release of the Bishop’s statement, some met with the Prime Minister at his office. A number of government officials noted their support for the release. However, in the days that followed, certain bishops distanced themselves from the statement even claiming they did not authorize their signatures. As of November 29, Holy Etchmiadzin’s commission had not completed its review process.
What Lies Ahead
The Church-State standoff is testing Armenia’s democratic maturity. If unresolved, it could reshape the nation’s political culture for a generation. Analysts warn that criminalizing dissent or diminishing the Church’s moral authority could fracture society further. Conversely, if the Church turns to overt political mobilization, it could undermine constitutional governance.
Observers see three potential outcomes: negotiated de-escalation mediated by respected national figures or diaspora intermediaries; prolonged institutional cold war—each side maintaining its constituency but avoiding open confrontation; further escalation if new arrests or property disputes igniting a deeper divide.
As of December 1, 2025, the government continues to insist on tighter control over the Church, with Pashinyan’s stance showing no signs of waning and the Mother See insisting on continued operational independence. Between them lies the fragile consensus of a society struggling to define itself after war, revolution, and loss.
