Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrossian has said that continued demands for the independence of Nagorno- Karabakh are unrealistic and that the current stalemate cannot continue indefinitely, Snark News Agency reported. Speaking at a news conference in Yerevan on September 26, Ter-Petrossian said that “at the current time the demands to give full independence to Nagorno-Karabakh or for it to unite with Armenia, just like any attempt to use force to make Azerbaijan capitulate, are not realistic,” the agency reported. He said that “the current indefinite status quo in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone cannot last for a long time,” adding that “the international community will not allow this.”
The Armenian president said there were two options for reaching a settlement of the Karabakh conflict - the single package option, and a stage-by-stage option. The first option would involve such issues as the liberation of occupied territory, the deployment of peacekeeping forces, the lifting of the economic blockade on Armenia, the return of refugees and others being resolved simultaneously with the determination of the status of Karabakh. Under the second option, the issue of Karabakh’s status would be postponed until a later date. Ter-Petrossian said he believed that the first option could be ruled out because both Azerbaijan and the Karabakh authorities were opposed to addressing the issue of the region’s status. “The president noted that this signifies nothing less than the fact that Baku and Stepanakert are not ready to discuss the status of Nagorno-Karabakh given their diametrically opposed approaches to resolving this issue,” the agency reported. This leaves a stage-by-stage settlement as the only viable option, and it is into this category that the latest proposals of the OSCE Minsk Group, which is mediating talks on a settlement in Karabakh, fall, he said. He added that the conflicting sides would inform the Minsk Group of their responses to the proposals in two or three weeks, and that if there is sufficient common ground these will serve as a basis for talks.
In a report on the same news conference, Noyan Tapan News Agency quoted Ter-Petrossian as saying that the Armenian public had to be ready to compromise on the Karabakh issue, and that they would see no improvement in their lives until it was settled. “Be bold enough to face up to the fact and make everyone aware that we will not live well until the Karabakh conflict is settled and the blockade of Armenia is lifted,” he was quoted as telling journalists. He added that any efforts to stimulate economic growth in Armenia would remain “cosmetic” until a settlement of the conflict was reached.
The president reiterated that any settlement must provide proper security guarantees for the population of Karabakh. “Regarding the future of Karabakh, the president said that whatever happened, the right of the Karabakh people to security and all their other rights had to be ensured,” the agency said, summarizing his remarks. “A native of Karabakh is no worse than a German or a French person,” he was quoted as saying. In a separate report, Snark said the Armenian president also touched on the issue of arms supplies to the Transcaucasian republics, which are being scrutinized by a trilateral Russian-Azerbaijani-Armenian commission set up to investigate statements by Russian government ministers earlier this year that Russian arms had been illegally supplied to Armenia. He said Baku had received “two or three times” more weapons and military equipment from abroad over the past five years than Yerevan. He added, however, that many of these had been put out of action during the Karabakh conflict. The military balance between Azerbaijan and Armenia is “roughly evenly balanced” at present, he said. “Were this not the case, Azerbaijan would long ago have resumed military actions with the aim of resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh problem by force,” the agency said, summarizing his remarks.
Karabakh Lead Er Ready to Make Concessions to Forge Ties with Daku
The president of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh republic (NKR), Arkady Ghukasian, has expressed readiness to “sacrifice certain elements of independence” in a bid to forge relations with Azerbaijan and cooperate with it in tackling certain issues, Interfax reported on October 20.
Speaking to the agency during a visit to Moscow last week, Ghukasian said areas of cooperation between Baku and Stepanakert could cover ecological issues, joint economic projects, finance, customs, drugs trafficking and human rights, the agency reported, adding that Ghukasian did not rule out the possibility of cooperation in defense issues.
“This will not curb the actual independence of Nagorno-Karabakh. We will live our own life,” he said, as quoted by Interfax. The NKR, however, will establish ties with Azerbaijan only as an equal partner, the Karabakh leader said and suggested that relations similar to those in the British Commonwealth could be established.
“But we do not agree to what Azerbaijan offers us - broad autonomy. We reject the very word,” Ghukasian said.
Acknowledging the difficulty faced by Baku in finding a face-saving formula to the Karabakh issue, Ghukasian called for an understanding on the actual status of the breakaway region. “I understand that Azerbaijan should not lose face. But I do not think that anything but autonomy is a loss of face for Azerbaijan. There is more to territorial integrity than autonomy. One should not make autonomy or independence all-important. We should sit down and tackle the relevant issues of relations between us,” he said.
Turning to the latest OSCE Minsk Group’s proposals for a Karabakh settlement, Ghukasian described them as unacceptable on the grounds that they “do not add up to a comprehensive solution of the problem which Nagorno-Karabakh is calling for”, the agency reported. The proposals, the NKR leader recalled, call for the withdrawal of Karabakh troops from occupied Azerbaijani areas, but fail to “even outline” the future status of Karabakh. Moreover, “the draft agreement on the status proposed by the mediators stated that Nagorno-Karabakh was part of Azerbaijan,” Ghukasian noted.
As for Armenia’s acceptance of the OSCE proposals, the Karabakh leader acknowledged the existence of “certain differences” between Karabakh and Armenia and criticized Yerevan for creating the impression that it saw Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan. “Armenia cannot compel us to accept the proposals of the Minsk Group. Armenia does, of course, have leverage to influence us, but using it would be very risky,” Ghukasian said. "Armenia must take a somewhat different stance because this super-constructive approach is understood as its willingness to view Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan.
Kocharian Dissents from Ter-Petrossian’ S Views on Karadakh
Prime Minister Robert Kocharian said he wants to see Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent state. In an interview for the Azerbaijani newspaper Yeddi Gun, published on October 25, he took issue with the main elements in Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrossian’s recent statement on Karabakh, which described independence for Karabakh as unrealistic and called for a stage-by-stage settlement of the conflict. He also disagreed with Ter- Petrossian’s assertion that the people of Armenia would see no improvement in their living standards until the Karabakh conflict was ended, saying it was not just Armenia but the whole region which would benefit from an end to the conflict. The following are excerpts from the interview:
The career of the former leader of the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh, current Armenian Prime Minister Robert Kocharian, could be considered breathtaking in its speed. At present he is the second person in official Yerevan and many people believe that it is Kocharian who can lay claim to the title of successor to Levon Ter-Petrossian. The prime minister spared us journalists 45 minutes and answered our questions. [BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: 10/28/97]
[Q] What is your vision of the future of Karabakh?
[A] I am one of the those who created a new future for Nagorno-Karabakh and I do not want to see its future as one of violated rights and subordination. I cannot imagine the possibility of present day Nagorno-Karabakh being subordinate to, and having vertical relations with, Azerbaijan. It is necessary to find some form of horizontal relations, this is my deeply-held belief. Azerbaijan is actively avoiding direct relations and it could be said that there has been no contact for four years now. The propaganda machine is continuing to sow the seeds of dissension and, although the Minsk Group proposes an option, it does not offer guarantees to Nagorno-Karabakh in the present conditions, where there is a lack of faith and no relations. In a nutshell, I would like to see Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent state.
[Q] What can you say about the well-known statement of the Armenian president?
[A] Two provisions there [in the statement] caused disputes. First of all, the stage-by-stage settlement of the conflict and the package agreement, and second the postulate that Armenia will not live well until the conflict is settled.
I do not agree with any of these thoughts. The fact that living standards will not improve concerns not only Armenia but the whole region: both us and Azerbaijan. As for the package agreement, the fact that the conflict has lasted for a long time shows that its geography, layout and the clash of interests will preserve the potential for conflict for a long time. The stage-by-stage settlement of the conflict would simply be dangerous because it would disturb the current situation. Both sides gain some advantage and it is natural that the desire to increase this success would arise. To return the territories means to violate the military balance. It is difficult to say in advance whether or not an appetite for all these territories will arise in Azerbaijan.
[Q] Could the changes in Azerbaijan’s economy have an impact on settling the conflict?
[A] The oil has completely hindered any settlement of the conflict. In 1994, we were closer than now. We had direct relations, we met and had talks. Then came the investments and oil contracts and you know what happened. The situation which arose after the war was disturbed as a result of Azerbaijan's oil expectations. A completely different situation arose.
[Q] Did the relations between the authorities and opposition in Armenia have any influence on settling the problem?
[A] Not only the opposition, but also the diaspora protect the independence of Karabakh, as well as the majority of the population of Armenia. Karabakh is not only a territory for Armenians, it is also an idea of national rebirth. If the Karabakh side does not give its consent, no resolution adopted in Armenia will be implemented, regardless of what government is in Yerevan. The Azerbaijani side says that if it agrees to start direct negotiations with Karabakh, this would amount to recognition of its independence. Negotiations do not mean recognition of independence, they simply mean de facto recognition of Karabakh as a side involved in the conflict.
[Q] There is a belief that even the ruling circles in Armenia and Karabakh feel sympathy for the Sadval movement. Are there any grounds for this?
[A] Would you believe me if I said that they do not feel sympathy for Sadval? Of course not. It is natural that in any conflict the sides look for supporters. There is identity of interests. You also feel sympathy for Turkey. Yes, there is sympathy [for Sadval], both in Karabakh and in Armenia, but Armenia understands that Sadval is operating in Russia today and it is the internal affair of Russia. We have a special agreement with Russia not to interfere in each other’s internal affairs. [BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: 10/28/97]
Karabakh Sees Direct Talks with Baku as Only Way to Resolve Conflict
The acting foreign minister of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh republic (NKR) has described direct talks between Baku and Stepanakert as the only way to resolve the Karabakh conflict. In an interview in Moscow with the Russian daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta, published on October 18, Naira Melkumyan said that the NKR saw Russia as “the most influential force” in the region and that the NKR delegation’s visit to Moscow had been aimed at explaining Karabakh’s position to Russian politicians.
The delegation would be making similar visits to France and the USA, which, alongside Russia, are the co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group mediating a settlement of the conflict. The following is the text of the interview with Melkumyan, as published by Nezavisimaya Gazeta:
[Interviewer] How does the Nagorno- Karabakh republic [NKR] view the new proposals by the OSCE Minsk Group on a settlement of the Karabakh conflict?
[Melkumyan] The proposals which originally constituted a package - on ending the armed conflict and on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh - have been on the negotiating table for nearly six months. We rejected the second proposal right away because it was based on the Lisbon statement by the former OSCE chairman, which automatically defined the status of the NKR as an autonomous part of Azerbaijan.
The first was unacceptable to us because it was based on the logic of the second. These proposals have changed in six months. But we do not accept the view that the question of clarifying the status of the NKR will only be resolved after the withdrawal of Karabakh forces from occupied territories. We are not only trying to stop the armed conflict but are also seeking to settle the Karabakh problem as a whole. This requires the elimination of all the causes that led to the problem, in particular the inadequate status of Nagorno-Karabakh, which prevents its people from living a secure life on their own territory.
[Q] What does the NKR foreign ministry base its position on?
[A] Common sense. We are not claiming that the Azerbaijani territories controlled by us should form part of the NKR, or that Armenians should live in them. The Azerbaijani areas were occupied by the Karabakh army for one reason: to create a security belt around Karabakh. Naturally, we can only return these territories in exchange for clear-cut international guarantees, and we regard an internationally- recognized status for the NKR as one of them.
We believe that as well as assuming responsibility for Nagorno-Karabakh’s security, the international community must also guarantee that its status will not be changed in any way. We appreciate that the world is not ready at the moment for another border change, and we are prepared to make significant concessions, but we want these concessions to be compensated for by Azerbaijan.
[Q] What was the Karabakh foreign ministry’s view of the proposals that [Azerbaijani President] Heydar Aliyev presented to [Armenian President] Levon Ter-Petrossian in Strasbourg?
[A] Only Baku and Stepanakert can resolve the Karabakh conflict by engaging in direct talks; no other state or international organization can do it for us. By sitting down with us at the negotiating table, Baku will recognize Stepanakert’s authority to express the interests of the people who live on this territory and have a right to an independent life, to security, to individuality and their own culture. Baku denies them all this at the moment, regarding the Karabakh people as an ethnic minority.
Baku’s position is destructive today also in the sense that its aim is to turn Nagorno-Karabakh into a two-community entity. We agree that the Azerbaijanis who lived in Nagorno-Karabakh should return home, but this does not mean that they should create independent administrative units. I think Azerbaijan is being inspired here by the example of Northern Cyprus. But new problems should not be created according to old recipes.
In the very near future, when the mediators come to the region again, we will present all these questions to them again. We have ideas on the co-chairmen’s new proposals. We may be able to persuade them that the methods currently being considered in the talks process - package and stage-by-stage - are very close to one another, and the combination of these two approaches is a possibility. In that case it would be easy to devise a new basis for talks.
[Q] What was the outcome of the Karabakh diplomatic efforts in Moscow?
[A] We came to Moscow because Russia was, is and will continue to be the most influential force in our region. We met not only with active politicians from the executive authorities, but also with legislators. We are entirely satisfied with their position on our problem. Naturally, the position of Russian figures who not only shape current policy, but also have an opportunity to determine the policy of the future is important to the NKR. We found an appreciative audience, and we hope that hearings on this issue will be held as a result of these meetings. It was interesting for us to see the entire Russian political spectrum.
We did not meet representatives of the Russian Foreign Ministry. We were aware of its position; it is manifested in the [OSCE Minsk Group] co-chairmen’s proposals.
The Russian part of the co-chairmanship was forced in many ways to adhere to the common policy conducted by the other members of the group. The main aim of our visit to Moscow was to avoid finding ourselves isolated and to get our partners to understand us. We are going to try to explain our position to French and US politicians too.
It is important today that the foundations of a settlement should not be determined by the oil factor alone. Otherwise a resumption of war is inevitable. The way they propose solving the Karabakh question today will not solve but intensify the problem. The Karabakh conflict smoldered for 70 years and flared up at the first whiff of democracy. The same will happen today unless the problem is solved on a just basis. [BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: 10/23/97]
Osce Considering Deploying Peacekeepers in Gyandza
The OSCE is considering a plan to deploy a m ultinational contingent of peacekeepers in Gyandza, the second biggest town in Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijani news agency Sharg reported on October
21.
The plan was discussed during talks between a visiting OSCE delegation and the head of the executive authorities in Gyandza. The proposed project, which also involves the establishment of the headquarters of the forces’ command and the office of the mission’s chief in the town, could start next year, provided a comprehensive peace agreement is concluded between the sides involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the agency reported.
It quoted the head of the OSCE delegation, named as Michel Ketsinger, as saying that under the plan a multinational contingent of OSCE peacekeepers would be brought into Gyandza via Turkish territory.
At his talks with the mayor of Gyandza, Rasim Dadashev, Ketsinger said that members of the delegation intended to familiarize themselves with the layout of the town and its people. “However, I can already say that Gyandza is a suitable town to accommodate the headquarters,” the agency quoted him as saying.
Briefing Ketsinger on the situation in the town, the mayor of Gyandza told the OSCE representatives that, among the tow n’s 400,000 inhabitants, there are 32,000 refugees and involuntary migrants who have suffered as a result of the military conflict with Armenia. [BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: 10/23/97]
EDITOR’S NOTE: Gyandza is a town of strategic importance. It is the site of one of Azerbaijan’s most sophisticated radar towers and a former Soviet military base.
Armenia Says Disagreements with Karabakh on Settlement Not New
Noting that Armenia has been advocating a stage-by-stage settlement of the Karabakh problem for four years now, Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian told journalists that disagreements over the method of settling this problem had always existed between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.
He said that these disagreements had become more obvious as a critical moment had now arrived, given that specific proposals had already been put forward and a decision had to be adopted. Oskanian expressed the hope that a resolution would be found “for it is possible that the will of Karabakh will prevail, since, in the final analysis, it is their problem.”
However, Oskanian added that this was also Armenia’s problem because they are the same Armenian people. The deputy foreign minister believes that the Nagorno-Karabakh position has been accepted by the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmen as normal. He added that there were also a variety of opinions in Armenia on a number of specific proposals.
During the co-chairmen’s forthcoming visit, the course of their future work will be clarified. On the issue of the return of Lachin and Shushi, Oskanian noted that Armenia had always insisted that these were two different issues: one a security and territorial issue, the other an issue of the return of refugees.
He also stressed that Karabakh President Arkady Ghukasian had noted on more than one occasion which options for limiting statehood were acceptable. But Armenia does not talk about this as it is an issue which concerns Karabakh itself.
In response to an Armenpress correspondent’s question about when direct talks might be possible between Nagorno- Karabakh and Azerbaijan, Oskanian said that in his view this would not happen in the near future. He said that the talks were currently going on according to the “three plus three” formula. Only after this could dialogue between Karabakh and Azerbaijan be expected [BBC: Summary of World Broadcasts 10/25/97]
Opposition Condemns Leadership’s “Defeatist Policy” On Karabakh
Fifteen thousand people joined a rally in Yerevan’s Freedom Square on October 31 dealing with the problem of Karabakh, organized by the Democratic Party of Armenia. “The fatherland is in danger,” academic Rafael Kazarian declared, pointing out that this slogan had been launched rather late because, for the past four years, “the authorities have been constantly yielding ground in the question of a settlement of the Karabakh conflict and are conducting a defeatist policy”
Kazarian stressed the importance “of purging the Armenian army of corrupt officers” because, in the situation that has emerged, it is especially important to carry out a purge and to rehabilitate and raise the morale and the fighting capabilities of the army.
A speech by the chairman of the National Democratic Union, Vazgen Manoukian, was the main one at the rally. He described the approaches to resolving the Karabakh conflict, outlined at the Armenian president’s news conference, as a betrayal, one of the main reasons for which, he said, was the illegitimacy of the current authorities.
“If we yield Karabakh, we shall become a pitiful country w ithout any future. If we stand up firmly in defense of positions on the independence of Karabakh, we shall become stronger,” Manoukian stressed. He pointed out that the bulwark of the people of Artsakh [Karabakh] and its leaders is “not Ter-Petrossian and not [Defense Minister] Vazgen Sarkisian, but all Armenians” [BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: 11/4/97]
Elchibey Takes Tough Line on Karabakh
The former Azerbaijani president and leader of the opposition People’s Front of Azerbaijan Party (PFAP), Abulfaz Elchibey, has condemned the OSCE’s latest proposals for a settlement of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, the Azerbaijani news agency ASSA-lrada reported.
Speaking at a Baku news conference on October 31, just a day after his return to the capital following four years of internal exile, Elchibey said the OSCE’s proposals to grant Karabakh a high level of autonomy within Azerbaijan were unacceptable. “Categorically condemning the latest proposals by the OSCE Minsk Group, Elchibey declared that he advocated granting Nagorno-Karabakh only cultural autonomy,” the agency reported.
He was also critical of the way the current Azerbaijani leadership was handling the Karabakh dispute. “The current authorities, linking oil and politics, are striving to put an end to the Karabakh war. But this will lead to an unpardonable error in the Karabakh issue,” he was quoted as saying.
Elchibey added, however, that he would try to achieve civil peace between Azerbaijan’s political parties and between the authorities and the opposition. “In his view, once a truce and civil peace are established between the opposition parties, it will be possible to influence the authorities,” the agency reported. He said he was prepared to run for the presidency in the elections scheduled for 1998, but added that, if this proves impossible, he would back Isa Gambar, the leader of the opposition Musavat party. If this also proves impossible, he would call on all parties to boycott the elections, he said.
Regarding international relations, Elchibey said that “all countries that are friendly to Azerbaijani and to Turkic people in general are friends of Azerbaijan,” the agency reported. He described Russia as “a close neighbor, a friendly country,” but named Iran as Azerbaijan’s traditional enemy.
“There are 30 million Azerbaijanis living in Iran but not a single Azerbaijani-language school; the Persians are historically the enemies of Azerbaijan,” the agency said, summarizing his remarks.
In a report on the same news conference, 77yra/7 News Agency quoted Elchibey as listing the Karabakh conflict, the problem of refugees, the consolidation of the opposition, and science and education as the most urgent issues currently facing the republic.
He warned that an unjust settlement of the Karabakh dispute would result in renewed conflict. “If the terms of a peace treaty on a settlement of the Armenian- Azerbaijani conflict are unjust, then the peace itself will be short-lived,” Turan quoted him as saying. [BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: 11/4/97]
Azeri Opposition Activist Warns Against Osce Karabakh Proposals
The secretary of the Azerbaijani opposition Musavat party, Sulhaddin Akbar, has warned that the latest OSCE proposals for a stage-by-stage settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are against Azerbaijani interests. In remarks made in an interview with Yeni Musavat, and summarized by the paper on October 28, Akbar argued that Armenia had captured the six districts surrounding Karabakh only to put pressure on Azerbaijan during the talks and also to ensure Karabakh's security. He said Armenia was the real winner in this because, if the settlement plan went ahead, the blockade against it would be lifted and agreement could even be reached on the Azerbaijani oil pipeline going via Armenian territory. Akbar said that Baku was trying to present this as a victory to give it something to claim as a success for the forthcoming elections. According to Akbar, there was also the danger that if the scheme went ahead Russia would lose its current means of exerting pressure in the region and would, therefore, try to find other means, such as “the Lezgin issue,” which Akbar believed to be much more dangerous for Azerbaijan. The following is the text of the report on the interview:
A process of intensification has been observed recently in the negotiations to settle the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. The Armenian leadership’s agreeing to the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmen’s proposals can be viewed as an important step towards settlement of this issue. However, the point is towards what settlement? Can we say that our lands will be liberated? We turned to the secretary of the Musavat Party, Sulhaddin Akbar, and asked him to comment on the latest situation in the process of settling the conflict.
Akbar said that the pressure put on Azerbaijan in the negotiating process had reached a peak. He said that, as the weaker side, Azerbaijan has to make concessions and retreat all the time. Akbar went on to say: The Azerbaijani side is glad that the plan for a stage-by-stage settlement suits its interests and that six districts would be liberated. However, let us take a look to this. What did Armenia want from Azerbaijan? Nagorno-Karabakh. Why has Armenia occupied the surrounding districts? For two purposes: the first purpose was to put pressure on Azerbaijan during negotiations and for the security of Nagorno-Karabakh. What does Armenia now gain? Nagorno-Karabakh remains part of Armenia and its security will be ensured by international forces. Moreover, all communications will be open, all communications blockades with Russia and Iran will be lifted, a gateway to Turkey will be opened, Armenia gains access to Europe and - the main thing - the issue of the strategic oil pipeline going via Armenia will become topical.
You see how Armenia resolves global and strategic issues by settling minor matters. But the Azerbaijani authorities are trying to present this to the Azerbaijani people as a victory. Armenian politicians have never said that they would not liberate these six districts. Sooner or later they would be liberated anyway. Why, do the [Azerbaijani] authorities agree to this option? Because the authorities will make any concession to receive even one district in the run-up to the presidential elections in 1998.
The authorities feel that their authority has been damaged. With this reputation, the authorities are afraid to go to the polls when international pressure has increased for these elections to be conducted in a democratic way. Therefore, the authorities are trying to make at least a slight improvement. Otherwise, the elections will either be postponed or they will be conducted formally like the last parliamentary elections. The liberation of six districts will not be a victory for the Azerbaijani people.
Imagine, international peacekeeping forces being deployed in Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia has solved its problems. It has direct relations with Nagorno-Karabakh. Moreover, it has international guarantees of the security of Nagorno-Karabakh. In this case, Azerbaijan has no other way of tackling this issue, for example, military and political ways. What means of pressure is there left for Azerbaijan to exert? Therefore, the Armenians will agree to have negotiations for many decades.
The liberation of the six districts around Nagorno-Karabakh under the proposals put forward means losing Nagorno-Karabakh, perhaps not forever, but at least for a long time. There is another danger. If the influence of the West increases and the solution of the problem remains in place, then Russia loses its means of exerting pressure. Therefore, Russia will have to use other means. This is the Lezgin issue. This is the most dangerous option.
The stage by stage settlement of the conflict suits all sides, except Russia and Azerbaijan, because Russia loses its means for exerting pressure and Azerbaijan has to make concessions which contradict its interests. [BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: 11/4/97]
President Aliyev Says Ter-Petrossian’s Position Gives Cause for Hope
President Heydar Aliyev has praised the stance adopted by his Armenian counterpart, Levon Ter-Petrossian, on the latest OSCE proposals for a settlement of the conflict over the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh, Turan news agency reported on October 22. "The position of President Ter-Petrossian inspires hope,” Aliyev told Turan. “My talks with Ter-Petrossian in Strasbourg give me grounds to say that the Armenian president has formed the opinion that the conflict should be settled on the basis of the latest proposals of the OSCE Minsk Group,” he added.
Also speaking on the subject of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenian Prime Minister Robert Kocharian, told visiting German Deputy Foreign M inister Helmut Schaefer that any settlement of the conflict over Karabakh must include firm guarantees of the freedom and security of the region’s population, Interfax reported from Yerevan.
Kocharian said he was confident that no mutually acceptable decision would be reached without a direct dialogue between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh.
Earlier this month, Armenia agreed to accept the stage-by-stage settlement plan proposed by OSCE Minsk Group. As paraphrased by the Azerbaijani news agency Sharg on September 24, at the first stage of the plan it is proposed that the Armenian side leave six occupied districts of Azerbaijan - Kelbajar, Agdam, Fizuli, Jebrail, Zangelan and Kubatli; that communications be restored between Armenia and Azerbaijan; and that refugees return to their homes. An OSCE peacekeeping contingent may be deployed in the region after the Armenian troops leave.
At the second stage, the town of Shushi, within Karabakh itself, and the Lachin corridor, which links Karabakh with Armenia, are to be liberated, in parallel with the determination of the status of Karabakh. [BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: 10/24/97]
War or Peace? Time for Thoughtfulness by Levon Ter-Petrossian
My September 26 press conference, more correctly that portion of the press conference that was devoted to Karabakh, became the occasion for the inflammation of intense passions in the press and at gatherings organized by the opposition. This did not surprise me; to some extent I had expected an even more vehement reaction.
The surprise was the quality of the debate, in fact, the absence of any debate. I must confess that I failed to achieve my objective, which was to stimulate...a serious debate on the thorniest problem facing the Armenian people, namely, the possible paths to resolve the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict.
The opposition’s response did not transcend the bounds of profanities, imputations, labeling, and distortions. No rational proposal was made, no alternative plan was offered, no well-grounded counter argument was introduced. One can reach two conclusions: the opposition does not have a plan for the resolution of the Karabakh conflict or, if it has one, it is hiding it and is far from being engaged in a task beneficial to the nation. I will refrain from harsher characterizations.
What did the people understand from the uproar made by the opposition? People understood that we have shed blood for Artsakh [Nagorno-Karabakh], that returning the occupied territories will endanger the existence of Artsakh, that the Armenian people are ready once again to shed blood for Artsakh, that we don’t give a damn about world public opinion, that we will bring both Azerbaijan and the international community to their knees, that the whole nation will turn into fedayees.
Then what? No one tried to give answers to the following simple questions:
Will doing all of that bring about our desired goal?
What will the world’s reaction be if we tell the world we don’t give a damn about it?
Will it be the blood of the 500 who gathered at the Cinema House or the blood of our innocent people that will be shed?
At least the last question has an unequivocal answer. Not a single hair will be lost from any one of the 500 who gathered at the Cinema House, notwithstanding their declarations of readiness for everything to the contrary. When Artsakh was in danger, when the enemy had just about reached Gandzasar, not one of the 500 responded to Vazgen Sargsian’s appeal and none joined the brigade of the death-row inmates. Our people must by now have had enough of those who seek glory and behave as heroes at the cost of the lives of others.
Besides partisan considerations, the confusion within the ranks of the opposition may also be explained by their ignorance. That is natural, since there are only six individuals in all of Karabakh and Armenia who have a command of the process of the resolution of the conflict: Arkady Ghukasian, Robert Kocharian, Alexander Arzoumanian, Vardan Oskanian, Jirair Libaridian, and I.
The Object of the Debate
At any rate, no debate ensued. This should disappoint neither me nor our public. Any political leader or intellectual aspiring to determine the fate of the nation will be compelled, sooner or later, to set aside the swearing...and to confront the people with a concrete and reasoned plan.
Without waiting for that to happen, I am ready today to discuss seriously any reasonable plan for the resolution of the Karabakh conflict and I agree to participate in a public debate at any level.
But a debate will be objective only when it accepts as starting points the answers which the participants must provide to a few key questions:
- Should the question of Karabakh be resolved through war or through negotiations?
- Is it possible to maintain the status quo and the unresolved state of the Karabakh question for ever or even for an extended period of time?
- What is in the interest of Karabakh and Armenia: the resolution or the nonresolution of the conflict?
- Will the question be resolved through compromise or with the defeat of one side? And which of the parties will be the defeated one?
I have often expressed my position clearly on these questions and still maintain that:
- War must be precluded; the question of Karabakh, therefore, must be resolved exclusively through peaceful negotiations.
- It is not possible to maintain the status quo for a long period of time because neither the international community nor Armenia’s economic capabilities will permit it.
- The unresolved state of the question is not in the interest of Karabakh or of Armenia, because that is palpably hindering the economic development of Armenia and, therefore, of Karabakh; it is causing complications in our relations with the international community and, especially, with neighboring countries that can have fatal consequences.
To solve the question of Karabakh we have only one option, a compromise solution, which does not mean that one side is the victor and the other the loser; it does mean finding an agreement based on what is possible when the conflict has reached maturity.
The opposition should not mislead the people by arguing that there is an alternative to the compromise: the alternative to compromise is war.
The rejection of compromise and maximalism (the drive to obtain the maximum rather than the possible) is the shortest path to the final destruction of Karabakh and the worsening of the situation in Armenia.
This is not a debate on losing or not losing Karabakh. Rather, it is on keeping Karabakh Armenian. Karabakh has been inhabited by Armenians for 3,000 years and so it must be for another 3,000 years.
The path I have chosen will secure that prospect and the means to preserve it, to reach our desired goal. The path of the adventurers will lead to certain defeat. Already once, “having turned Istanbul into a sea of blood”, we lost Western Armenia; and on another occasion, we lost half of Eastern Armenia while demanding the territories designated by the Treaty of Sevres.
Besides the essence of the compromise, its timing is also important. It is obvious that in the case of a compromise, the stronger party has the chance of obtaining the maximum possible. Today Armenia and Karabakh are stronger than ever. But in the event of the non-resolution of the conflict, within a year or two they will be substantially weakened. That which we are rejecting today, we will be asking for tomorrow, but we will not get it, as has often happened in our history.
We must be realistic and understand that the international community will not for long tolerate the situation created around Nagorno-Karabakh because that is threatening regional cooperation and security as well as the West’s oil interests. Sooner or later the parties will be presenting a compromise plan for the resolution of the conflict. This plan will provide for a political, not legal, solution, although the big powers will be offering it as a model articulation of international law. Neither Azerbaijan nor Karabakh and Armenia will be able to reject the compromise, just as was the case with the parties in the Bosnian and Arab-lsraeli conflicts.
A mutually acceptable compromise should not be seen, however, solely as an imposition. On the contrary, the conflicting parties themselves must exert gigantic efforts to achieve it, because the alternative, as stated, is war and new sufferings for the peoples involved.
Compromise is not a choice between the good and the bad, but rather between the bad and the worse; that is, compromise is just a means to avoid the worst, from which the parties benefit when they have become conscious of the worst and are able to display the necessary political will and courage.
In reaching out for a compromise, parties usually are guided by a few considerations: to free themselves of a conflict that hinders their normal functioning and development and is full of dangers; to postpone it to gain time, to gather their forces and resolve it at a time more propitious for them; and to avoid unpredictable complications, hoping that in the future the thinking of peoples may undergo changes and values may be reassessed, as a result of which the issue will lose its acute character and borders, for example, will lose the significance they have today. Such thinking and reassessment of values are dominant now in Europe; tomorrow they could also become dominant in the Near East. The Arab-lsraeli peace process may be a testimony to that.
Compromise will satisfy every party to the conflict to some extent, but at the same time it will fully satisfy none of them. President Aliyev will present that compromise as the victory of Azerbaijan, while I will try to present it as Armenia’s. The Azerbaijani opposition will charge that Aliyev has committed an act of treason and sold Karabakh. The opposition in Armenia will consider that I have acted treacherously and sold Karabakh.
In such circumstances one could not exclude the possibility of the Rabin-Peres syndrome. One should also not ignore the Netanyahu syndrome: having come to power with uncompromising positions, within a short time, albeit unwillingly, he was compelled to continue the peace process started by Rabin and Peres.
Some Misconceptions
As part of the propaganda campaign undertaken in the aftermath of my press conference, the opposition has put in circulation a number of misconceptions, some of which I consider necessary to address briefly.
The first misconception, a dangerously misleading premise if you wish, is that the antagonist of Karabakh in this conflict is Azerbaijan, which can easily be brought to its knees. In reality, however, the antagonist is the international community to which, in fact, we are throwing the gauntlet. Not to understand this simple fact means subjecting our people to calamitous trials and tribulations.
The second misconception is the baseless insistence that Karabakh has won the war and, therefore, has no need to accept a compromise. Unfortunately, Karabakh has won the battle, not the war.
A war is considered won only when the foe has been forced into capitulation. The confusion between battle and war has brought misfortune to many.
The third misconception is that since we have succeeded in everything so far, success awaits us in the future as well. That is, so far we have defeated Azerbaijan, we are certain to do so in the future; we have been able to resist external pressures in the past, we can continue to do so in the future, etc. This may be the most dangerous of the misconceptions because it views the successes of the past rather than the relation of forces in the future as the guarantee for future success.
Those who think in this manner have a serious problem with the elementary laws of logic. Had future victories been predicated upon past successes, then once a victor, a party would always remain a victor. The Roman Empire, for example, should never have been destroyed.
The next misconception...is the assertion that the President of Armenia is selling Karabakh to keep himself in power. It is difficult to believe that even a mentally deficient person could concoct the argument that any one in Armenia could maintain power by selling Karabakh.
Myths and Riddles
There are also persistent assertions in the arena of Armenia’s political thinking and public opinion which belong to the field of myths and riddles.
First Myth. Armenia is exerting pressure on the authorities of Nagorno- Karabakh.
Regarding this assertion, I can state with full responsibility that only once Armenia has exerted pressure on Nagorno-Karabakh. That was in 1993, to convince it to participate in the negotiations of the Minsk group; that participation has fully justified itself.
Armenia has no intention to exert pressure on Nagorno-Karabakh either today or tomorrow. It is the authorities of Karabakh that make decisions in the name of Karabakh, naturally bearing responsibility for their decisions not only before the population of Karabakh but also the entire Armenian people. This does not mean that Armenia will not consult with the authorities of Karabakh and try to persuade them regarding issues it considers appropriate. But the final decision remains with the Karabakh authorities.
Second Myth. Should Armenia adopt a tough position vis-a-vis Turkey and confront it with the issues of the recognition of the Genocide, of the revocation of the Treaty of Kars, and of territorial demands, then Turkey and Azerbaijan will make more concessions on the question of Karabakh.
It is my deep conviction, which I can demonstrate through concrete political analysis, that such a position would not bring any advantages to the solution of the Karabakh problem, it would also result in new com plications in the relations between Turkey and Armenia that would further aggravate the situation of Armenia and Karabakh.
It should be obvious to the naked eye that, quite to the contrary, such a position would provide additional bases for Azerbaijan and Turkey to charge that Armenia is an expansionist state and to set against Armenia an already unfavorable international public opinion.
Third Myth. Had Armenia utilized the diaspora’s lobbying capabilities correctly, then diaspora communities would not have permitted their governments to trample upon the rights of Nagorno- Karabakh.
Before commenting on this myth, it is necessary to point out that of all the diaspora communities, it is only the Armenian-American one that has lobbying capabilities; other countries do not have lobbying traditions and, therefore, there are no organized lobbying groups elsewhere.
I do not underestimate, of course, the lobbying work of the Armenian-American community to produce serious humanitarian assistance to Armenia and shape an opinion favorable to Nagorno- Karabakh in the US Congress. One should not forget, at the same time, that lobbying has its limits: its influence ends where US national interests begin. That is the case not only for the Armenian but also for all other lobbying organizations. This includes the Jewish lobby which, while being considered the strongest, is not omnipotent.
Fourth Myth. The current cosmopolitan minded authorities of Russia do not understand the strategic interests of their country (in this matter Armenia shares the guilt, since it has failed to explain this fact to them). But soon the genuinely nationalistic forces will come to power in Russia and, turning Armenia into the Israel of the Caucasus, will resolve the Karabakh question to our advantage.
Every one of the assumptions underlying this myth is suspect and questionable....
Does it require great intelligence to understand that, whatever the forces governing it, Russia could never recognize the independence of Karabakh, because it has twenty of its own Karabakhs?
Fifth Myth. Working very actively in international fora and media, Azerbaijan has actually won the propaganda war (which is often confused with diplomatic victory).
This may be the only myth that is not totally baseless. Compared to Armenia and Karabakh, Azerbaijan has in fact made much noise in international fora and the media. The reason, however, is quite simple, and it is natural. What else was left to do for Azerbaijan? It had lost the military confrontation, lost any control over Karabakh, been deprived of territories, and fallen under the pressure of some five hundred thousand refugees. What answer were the President and Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan to give to their people other than pretend they were bravely struggling for the conquest of their territories by raising a lot of noise?
Even if it were true that we have lost the propaganda war, then we must determine what was more preferable: to preserve Karabakh and lose the propaganda war or lose Karabakh and win a brilliant victory in the propaganda arena? We have won so many propaganda and moral victories in history that perhaps that sort of victory is more to our taste. This does not mean, of course, that we should ignore propaganda activity and not undertake measures to neutralize the impact of Azerbaijani propaganda.
Let us stop here with the listing of myths and move on briefly to a few of the riddles, leaving their solution to those with exceptional ingenuity.
First Riddle. It is possible to achieve the goal of independence for Karabakh and at the same time avoid war (from Vazgen Manoukian’s campaign platform).
What do we have here? A lightning in the mind of a genius, incomprehensible to the common mortal, or a temporary dimming of the brain that can happen to anyone? Perhaps President Aliyev has whispered something in the ear of its author that remains unknown to us. At any rate, this is a riddle presented to the Armenian political mind that even Einstein could not decipher.
Second Riddle. It is possible to ignore the international community yet continue receiving assistance from it.
Due to my position, I am the most in contact with leaders of the international community. I have never received such assurances from them. On the contrary, with each step we see the subtly covered conditioning of assistance by political considerations. Perhaps here, too, we are guilty of being unable to explain to the international community its strategic interests. It is true that we are neglecting our mission as a universal nation, i.e., of giving lessons to the whole world.
Third Riddle. We, the opposition, have no plan for the resolution of the Karabakh conflict. But since the current leadership, lacking a national ideology, is incapable of resolving that question, then give us the power and we will resolve it, while incidentally also restoring Armenia’s industry, increasing wages five to ten fold, and inundating the country with foreign investments.
I do not even know whether I should comment on this riddle. But I cannot but point out that in politics sincere statements do not constitute an argument and the people have never turned power over to anyone trusting in his sincere word, especially when that word, in addition to containing a riddle, comes closer to a genre of mythology replete with miracles.
A Package or Step By Step Solution?
The opposition press is exerting every effort to convince the public that Nagorno-Karabakh supports the package solution while Armenia favors the step by step solution, the latter being full of dangers. I might not have raised this issue if, to my surprise, representatives of Karabakh had not made statements along the same line.
Those who followed closely my September 26 press conference will have noted that I characterized both - the package and the step by step solutions - as “realistic options.” I also pointed out that Armenia accepted, with serious reservations, the first plan proposed by the Minsk group co-chairmen, which was nothing less than a package solution to the question. It was only after both Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh rejected that option categorically and in writing that the co-chairmen were compelled to propose a step by step solution.
In that press conference I stated: “What, in fact, did happen? The mediators and all of us became convinced that both Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh were not prepared to discuss the issue of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, because each of the two has its own conception of that status that is in sharp conflict with that of the antagonist. All concerned were convinced of this. I believe that the choice then went to the only realistic approach. If such an option [a package solution] is not accepted, meaning it cannot be realized, then we must today try to realize the ‘step by step’ alternative.” (Hayastani Han-rapetutyun, 27 September, 1997.)
By first rejecting the package, then the step by step solutions, and today proposing to return to the package approach, the Karabakh side has put both Karabakh and Armenia in an uncomfortable situation. Nonetheless, I do not think that we are facing tragedy or a deadlock, since it is possible to combine these two approaches easily.
The main thing today is the resumption of negotiations that have been interrupted for a year. This requires that finally the parties to the conflict sometime soon accept a draft document that would constitute the basis for the negotiations. If that does not occur before the next Ministerial Meeting of the OSCE to be held in Copenhagen in December, then we can expect serious complications.
Conspiracy Is Ruled Out
There is also an attempt by the opposition to create the impression that the co-chairmen are organizing a conspiracy against Karabakh, to which Levon Ter-Petrossian is participating because of his inaptitude or his treacherous intentions. The secrecy of negotiations is specially capitalized to create this impression, although I believe I have discussed that aspect exhaustively in my address to the 9th ANM Congress. I am compelled to quote the relevant passage:
“Secrecy does not necessarily mean treachery. This is simply international diplomatic practice that facilitates the process of negotiations, keeping it at a distance from unnecessary noise and propagandists exploitations. Suffice it to remind ourselves that the current Arab-Israeli negotiations were preceded by years of secret negotiations.
It is clear that secrecy applies only to the negotiating phase. But once agreements have been achieved and before the signing of final treaties, the plan for the resolution will naturally be presented to the judgment of our people as well as of the peoples of Artsakh and Azerbaijan.
I can assure you of one thing. Armenia will never sign any document which does not also carry the signature of Nagorno-Karabakh.” (Hayastani Han- rapetutyun, July 15, 1997.)
It would seem that everything that needed to be said is said for any thinking person, for any one with elementary mental capabilities. But those who are habitual tricksters and suffer from a feverish need to mislead the public do not feel compelled to appear logical and, generally speaking, have little to do with reason, since it is possible for them to get achieve their goal by distorting the opponent’s words and hiding their own nakedness behind imagined ascriptions, relying on the worst human instincts.
Conspiracy is ruled out essentially not due to subjective reasons, i.e., not because either Ter-Petrossian or someone else wishes to think or pictures the situation to be so, but strictly from a legal point of view. That is, there will in effect be a clear legal mechanism for the review of the resolution of the Karabakh conflict that will involve the following consecutive phases:
A. As noted above, once agreements are reached but before the signing of final treaties, the plan will be presented to the judgment of the interested peoples;
B. Any conflict resolution plan or treaty requires the signature of Nagorno- Karabakh;
C. Following the signature, any plan or treaty must be ratified by the respective parliaments of the conflicting parties. As we can see, both the people and the opposition will have the opportunity to review the resolution process and to impact its outcome. I would be only too gratified if during public discussions and parliamentary debate the opposition came forth with alternative proposals, which would give us the possibility of reaching the right decision, because on the question of Karabakh we have no right to make mistakes.
Let us not be preoccupied with self-deception and let us not cherish hollow illusions. On the issue of Karabakh’s independence we have no allies. No one will resolve the present enigma but us. We are the ones who must resolve it, and we will resolve it to the extent that our capabilities allow us. Our only ally is our rejection of adventurism.
It is not my intention to present a tragic picture or to sound the alarm because I am confident of the circumspection of our people. [Hayastani Han-rapetutyun, 11/1/97]
Karabakh Authorities Criticize Ter-Petrossian over Peace Plans
Armenian authorities in the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) have criticized comments by Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrossian, in which he reportedly accused them of damaging the cause of Armenia and Karabakh by their changes of stance on peace proposals for the disputed territory.
A statement by the NKR’s foreign ministry on November 6, as reported by Interfax news agency, “expressed disagreement with certain facts and evaluations” in an article by Ter-Petrossian published the previous day in the Moscow daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta. The NKR statement referred to differences with the Armenian president over the latest proposals by OSCE mediators for a stage-by-stage settlement of the conflict with Azerbaijan over Karabakh, under which Karabakh forces would initially withdraw from six districts of Azerbaijan proper that they have captured and the status of Karabakh would be decided at a later point. NKR leaders advocate a single- stage “package solution” to the issue, but Ter-Petrossian has recently urged the Karabakh Armenians to agree to the mediators’ stage-by-stage approach.
The Karabakh statement quoted Ter-Petrossian as saying in his Nezavisimaya Gazeta article that “by rejecting first the package and then the stage-by-stage settlement options and now suggesting to return to the package deal again, the Karabakh side has placed both Karabakh and Armenia in an awkward position.”
As quoted by Interfax, the NKR statement expressed regret that the Armenian president “was not quite correct” in his description of the Karabakh leadership’s approach to the package and stage-by- stage options of settling the conflict. It described the two-part plan proposed by the OSCE Minsk Group in May as a proposal for “a comprehensive settlement” and continued: “Thus, the so-called comprehensive agreement did constitute a package solution of the problem in the methodological sense.”
When the NKR authorities rejected the mediators’ initial proposals, the statement continued, they did so not out of hostility to the concept of a “ package solution,” but because the proposals themselves were based on the declaration passed at last December’s OSCE summit in Lisbon, “which did not become an official document thanks to the stance of Armenia.” “We find it necessary to emphasize once again that the Karabakh leadership did not reject a package settlement in general but this particular draft based on the principles of the Lisbon summit declaration,” the statement said. By insisting on a package settlement now, the Karabakh leadership “does not contradict any of its old fundamental views consistently advocated at all levels of the negotiating process on the peaceful settlement of the conflict under the auspices of the OSCE,” the statement added, as quoted by Interfax. [BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: 11/8/97]
Karabakh Rejects Latest Osce Peace Proposals
Armenian authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh have rejected the latest proposals of OSCE mediators as a basis for talks on a settlement, the Russian news agency Interfax reported. Speaking to Interfax after talks with the co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group in Stepanakert on November 8, Karabakh foreign minister Naira Melkumyan said the OSCE proposals for a stage-by-stage settlement were unacceptable. She said Karabakh was insisting on a “package” settlement, under which the status of the region would be decided simultaneously with the resolution of other issues, including the withdrawal of troops from occupied territory. “Nagorno-Karabakh put forward its position and made several proposals for mediators to study,” the agency said, summarizing remarks by Melkumyan. [BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: 11/11/97]
In another report, Arkady Ghukasian, president of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, told Interfax the Minsk Group peace proposal was unacceptable. ’Obviously we cannot accept this plan,” he said after talks with international mediators in his Stepanakert headquarters. He said Baku wanted to split Nagorno-Karabakh into Azerbaijani and Armenian controlled sectors, similar to the situation on the divided Mediterranean island of Cyprus, split into Greek and Turkish Cypriot zones. Under the Minsk plan, Nagorno- Karabakh would be granted a high degree of autonomy but remain a part of Azerbaijan which - like Armenia, the territory’s principal backer against Baku - has accepted the plan. Yerevan is keen for its ethnic cousins in Nagorno-Karabakh to accept the plan put forward by France, Russia and the United States, to end the economic blockade imposed by Azerbaijan on Armenia. Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrossian said in September that Armenia would only be able to live normally once the Nagorno-Karabakh problem was resolved. [Agence France Presse 11 /8 /97]
Karabakh Says It Won’t Be Bullied Into Peace Deal
Arkady Ghukasian said on November 18 he would not be forced into a peace deal and warned that conflict could flare anew. Ghukasian said in a newspaper interview: “There is an impression that deals are being made behind our backs, to force our hands into the fire to grab hot coals.” He added: “The suggestions which are currently being discussed are leading us towards war.” Ghukasian acknowledged a deep rift which has opened up between his government and the Armenian government.
Both Armenia and Azerbaijan have signaled support for a two-stage plan, advocated by international mediators in the so-called Minsk Group of countries chaired by the United States, Russia and France, to resolve the situation. In the first stage, Karabakh forces would give up six regions of Azerbaijan which they captured.
International peacekeepers would then move in, leaving the status of Nagorno- Karabakh to be decided later. But the Karabakh government wants the questions resolved simultaneously, and Ghukasian and some opposition political groups in Armenia are protesting against the plans. Ghukasian said it was possible that Ter-Petrossian had been put under pressure from the international community because of the oil interests at stake. The shortest proposed major pipeline routes to bring Caspian crude to world markets would cross Nagorno-Karabakh. Others come perilously near a front line between Azeri and official Armenian forces held at bay by the fragile 1994 ceasefire. “I don’t rule out that talk about a possible pipeline from Baku to (Turkey’s Mediterranean port of) Ceyhan has played a role,” Ghukasian said. "We will not be used to solve someone else’s problems.” Diplomats in the region have said that a peace deal might be forced through despite the objections of people in Karabakh. Its only route to the outside world is through a land corridor cut through Azerbaijan to Armenia. [Reuters 11/18/97]
Authorities Opting Out Over Karabakh, MP Says
The forthcoming Copenhagen meeting of OSCE foreign ministers could turn out to be another Lisbon for Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, but with even graver consequences, Armenian MP David Shakhnazarian told a news conference in Yerevan. Shakhnazarian thinks that if the authorities and other political forces in the country are incapable of assuming responsibility when it comes to a political solution of the problem on the basis of the Nagorno-Karabakh people’s right to self-determination, then Armenia should simply recognize the independence of the Nagorno-Karabakh and withdraw from the negotiating process on a settlement of the conflict, thereby leaving the people of the Nagorno-Karabakh republic to decide their own fate. [BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: 11/18/97]
