Barry Zorthian is a consultant and partner in the firm of Alcalde & Fay in Washington, serving clients in the fields of economic development, government and public affairs. He is also, by appointment, a member of the Board for International Broadcasting, which oversees Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.
A retired Vice President of Time Inc. (now Time Warner), first as President of Time Life Broadcasting, with responsibility for corporate interests in cable, radio and television, and then as Vice President for Government Affairs in Washington, DC., Mr. Zorthian is a graduate of Yale University and the New York University School of Law.
Mr. Zorthian spent 13 years with the Voice of America, the last five as Program Manager, and more than seven years in the Foreign Service. He was stationed in India and then in Vietnam, where he was chief U.S. spokesman for four and a half years during the Vietnam War.
Mr. Zorthian has been a member of the Central Board of the AGBU since 1970.
Washington is the site for the formation of United States foreign policy and thus the starting point for actions that affect both the Armenian-American community in the United States and the people of the Republic of Armenia. The government structure here does not stand alone in the process. Input is received from embassies overseas, from experts in think tanks and universities; from political parties; from the media; from the diplomatic corps; and in the long run perhaps most importantly from non-governmental groups and individuals that represent citizens of other countries, as members of the Armenian-American community do.
But Washington is the ultimate crucible — at the State Department, at the Defense Department, at the National Security Council, in Congress and finally at the desk of the President — where the decisions are made and instructions are issued, to operating agencies and to embassies overseas, to carry out adopted policy in individual countries and in multinational organizations like the United Nations.
Washington is also the source of national policies on domestic issues which affect every citizen of the country and which can be of considerable concern to special interest communities like the Armenian-Americans. However, it is the foreign policy aspect of their community's Washington presence that draws the most interest today and is the focus of this article.
The Armenian-American community has become an active participant in the foreign policy process over the course of the 24-years since the first meeting at Airlie House in 1971 that laid the foundations for the Armenian Assembly. The Assembly was conceived by John Hane- sian and Haigaz Gregorian, faculty members of universities in Washington at the time. It was joined initially by most diaspora elements in its adopted role as an umbrella organization representing Armenian-American community interests in the nation's capital with one voice. Many of these elements decided to go their separate ways in the mideighties. Since then, a number have become active in the Washington arena under their own banner: the Armenian National Committee, the Diocese and the Prelacy, AGBU's Armenian Information Service, Aramac, and individuals operating independently.
Added more recently to this expanded community representation was the Armenian Embassy, which has become a force in its own right since its representatives first arrived on the scene in 1992. As the diplomatic arm of the Armenian government, the embassy constitutes an independent presence and is in frequent communication with representatives of the community.
Today, the Armenian-American community is highly visible and very actively involved in the foreign policy process through the work of these multiple representatives. Both Armenian and non-Armenian observers generally give them high marks in producing results. The Turkish and Azeri ambassadors have often complained about the influence of "the powerful Armenian lobby," and neutral observers have frequently sighted these agencies as an example of the way in which relatively smaller ethnic communities can have an impact in Washington.
At the same time both congressional and executive department sources point out that divided community representation has its drawbacks. They note that sheer numbers provide greater reach and intensity but, at the same time, duplication can lead to unnecessary expenditure of resources, loss of consistency and even contradictions in the message. If the community's internal politics could ever make it possible, these sources urge a return to a thoroughly coordinated approach for maximum impact.
The problems of a divided presence are not new to ethnic representation in Washington. Many groups have had a dual or even more fragmented presence. Greek-Americans for example have frequently had organizational differences and at times tensions with Cypriot-Americans. But other communities have been able to develop a structure which brings all their voices together for maximum and consistent impact and still permits individual organizations to preserve their own identity and character.
Experts here invariably point to the Jewish community as the outstanding example of this form of unification. Despite considerable internal differences and a multiplicity of organizations, the Jewish community has been able to develop a highly effective coordinating agency in the American Israel Political Action Council (AIPAC). There are others. Specialists point to such examples as the Polish-American Committee, and Asian-American organizations that provide an umbrella for the Chinese, the Koreans, the Vietnamese and others.
Whatever the merits of this debate on the organizational question, Washington analysts agree that the present effort has produced commendable results to date. In seeking an assessment of the community's efforts from a variety of sources, it is useful now, three and a half years after President Bush's Christmas Eve diplomatic recognition of Armenia, to look at what the process has produced in terms of present relations between these two countries of enormous contrast: the United States, an immense super power of 250 million people, placed strategically between two vast oceans with Western Europe on one side and Japan and the Chinese mainland on the other; and Armenia, a relatively tiny republic of three million, tucked away in a part of the world far removed from the American horizon and experience.
Foreign policy specialists interviewed for this article believe the state of this bilateral relationship is best measured at two levels. The first is centered on current more immediate problems growing out of the 1988 earthquake, the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and the efforts of a newly independent Armenia, assisted directly by its diaspora, to move forward on the path to a democratic political structure and a market place economy. The second level consists of the longer term strategic relationship between the two countries. Clearly, these two levels are interrelated and have an impact on each other. However, analysts tend to see them as separate segments of the overall relationship between these two unevenly matched nations seeking to find common ground for the future.
In terms of the first aspect, the status in regards to more immediate problems, observers describe the relations as good; in fact very solid. Armenia has been given high priority and worldwide is the third largest recipient of American assistance on a per capita basis. Analysts say the quick and generous response of the United States to Armenia's immediate needs is a result of humanitarian considerations based on America's long standing tradition of responding to natural disaster anywhere in the world, and America's interest in the development of the former Soviet Republics as independent countries with a democratic market economy orientation, backed by energetic pressure.
These two factors have been considerably strengthened by the increasing political activism and the aggressive pressure of the Armenian-American community. The American response also draws on the memories of American assistance to Armenians in the World War I period (though it must be noted that America and the Allies at that time abandoned the fledgling country of Armenia, a fact not often remembered in this city, but perhaps a source of some feeling of guilt on the part of the United States).
The Agency for International Development reports that in addition to immediate post-earthquake relief assistance, the U.S. has provided more than $450 million in aid to Armenia since 1992. This aid has helped ease the devastation of the earthquake and also relieved some of the economic burden growing out of the blockades imposed by Azerbaijan and Turkey. Gradually, the assistance is being shifted to developmental aid to help the basic Armenian economy, looking ahead particularly to the time when the Nagorno-Karabakh situation reaches some sort of acceptable resolution.
The level of economic assistance will probably be reduced in absolute terms in coming years as a byproduct of the overall reduction in foreign aid resulting from the current slimming down of the American budget. However, Armenia's proportionate share is likely to remain at the high end of the scale for the reasons cited by the analysts. At the same time, both Congressional and Administration sources emphasize that important factors in maintaining Armenia as a high priority will be Washington's continued confidence that Armenia will preserve its independence, remain on the path to democratic progress, continue its development of a market economy and contribute to stability in the area through productive working relations with its neighboring states.
The bilateral relationship to date, while generally very positive, has not been without its difficulties. Armenian- American representatives in Washington point out that the United States under both Republican and Democratic administrations has disappointed the Armenian community by refusing to issue an unambiguous Presidential acknowledgment of the Genocide, and by failing to sufficiently pressure both Turkey and Azerbaijan to raise their Karabakh-related blockades. And the United States has not been successful — nor has anyone else — in resolving the Karabakh issue, such as by producing an acceptable formula either directly or in concert with Russia or any multi-national organization.
On the other side of the ledger, recent events in Armenia have raised concerns in Washington in regard to the political aspects of development in Armenia. In addition, the Armenian-American community's constant pressure for denunciation of Turkey has created problems for the United States in its relations with an important ally.
Turning to the second level of relations between the two countries, the longer range strategic aspect, American foreign policy is much more tentative and is still evolving in the view of foreign policy specialists.
They cite a number of reasons for this state of affairs. Major concerns in other parts of the world — Bosnia, the Middle East peace process, NATO expansion and relations with Russia, North Korean nuclear capabilities, Somalia, Japanese trade, the list is a lengthy one — have commanded the priority attention and energies of senior American policy makers, to some neglect of other less immediate problems. And then the conflict in Karabakh and economic conditions in the area have absorbed whatever time and resources were left over from these other crises.
Nevertheless, these sources point out that even given the time and attention, the basic reason for the still tentative nature of American foreign policy towards Armenia is the fact that Armenia, just as any other country, is part of a bigger whole. This broader setting is not limited to just the Transcaucasus area but in a very real sense consists of the entire Eurasian continent dominated by Russia in the northern tier, and Turkey, Iran and the Central Asian Countries along the southern tier. Except for the sentimental relationship that results from the existence of the diaspora, the experts note that direct political and economic ties between the United States and Armenia are currently and potentially very limited at best. They make the point that from America's geopolitical viewpoint, the long range importance of Armenia lies in its strategic location.
Conversations with well-placed sources provide this analysis: Armenia is at the very heart of the Eurasian region, as is the entire Transcaucasus. It occupies a crucial crossroads as it has for centuries. This geography remains the same but the roles of the nations in the area keep shifting and changing, as both internal and world developments unfold. These sources say the U.S. and its policy towards the region and towards individual countries within it, must adjust to the world as it is today and must determine the nature of the world that it wants to see tomorrow. U.S. policy cannot remain preliminary and tentative if it is to develop and grow.
The analysts add that America's long term attitudes and policy towards Armenia as just one nation in the vast area of Eurasia will change, depending to a considerable extent on policies that the United States develops towards the new Russia, towards NATO ally Turkey, towards the currently outcast state of Iran and towards the largely unfamiliar lands of Central Asia.
These sources emphasize that the American judgements in these relationships must — and will — be made on the basis of what Washington considers American self-interest, and it is from this perspective that the Armenian-American community must seek to influence the eventual outcome of the evolutionary process in American foreign policy towards Armenia.
In the broadest terms, America's ultimate goals for the area are seen by these observers as stability and economic progress achieved through the development of democratic institutions and market place economies. More specifically, America today seeks:
- A productive working partnership with Russia if at all possible, both for the overriding priority of reducing any potential nuclear threat and in order to avoid the emergence of a resurgent nationalist Russia reaching out beyond its borders. To do so, the U.S. must be prepared to recognize and be responsive to Russia's legitimate interests in the area.
- Continuation of its close military and economic relations with Turkey, which it sees as an important bulwark against the spread of militant Islamic fundamentalism in the area, and as a hedge against an expansionist Russia. Turkey, of course, has a number of difficult problems of its own — the Kurdish situation, the economy, the growth of Islamic fundamentalism, Cyprus, relations with Iraq and Iran. For the U.S. to maintain its role in Turkey, it must take these Turkish problems and interests into account.
- Isolation of Iran under its present government in order to undermine what is considered Iranian support of terrorism and a threat to regional governments.
- Access to and development of the Caspian oil basin, and at the same time gradual development of U.S. relations with the Central Asian states, both for their potential role as buffer states between Russia and the southern tier, and as sources of raw materials and markets.
Public statements and informal conversations indicate that the Armenian government certainly is sensitive to these factors and will take them into account as it pursues its own interests in its relations with the United States. There is every reason to believe that this self-interest would be well served by close, positive relations with the United States as part of Armenia's natural ties to the West, as a balance to Russia, as a source of developmental assistance, and as an element of critical political support in the region. Such judgements, of course, are decisions for the Armenian government, not the Diaspora, but they seem self-evident.
At the same time, Washington sources believe a strong case can be made that America's goals in the area would be well served by a friendly, economically strong, politically stable and democratic Armenian State, located on so critical a site on the Eurasian continent. U.S. support could contribute significantly to stability in the region, and provide a conduit and channel to Armenia's many neighbors.
Observers in both Congress and the Executive Branch acknowledge that the Armenian-American community has been very effective in moving the U.S. government to meeting Armenia's immediate humanitarian and economic needs.
They are less certain that the community will be as successful with America's longer range policies towards Armenia in the future. They point out that policy recommendations that demand blanket American condemnation of Turkey or are based solely on the needs of Armenia, do not serve America's interests well or provide a sufficient foundation for American foreign policy. Such programs are not likely to be sustained for long, if at all.
These observers believe that the task of the Armenian-American community in the development of American foreign policy in the Eurasian region is to identify and advocate policies and programs in America's self-interest that match and are consistent with the self-interests of Armenia. They believe there is considerable potential for such an effort. They find a democratic, economically advanced Armenia a positive and attractive prospect. As a strong friend, and even an ally, of the United States, Armenia could serve as a crossroads between the various major powers and surrounding areas in the region. Observers believe that the Armenian-American community could show that these goals would certainly be in America's own interest — and fortunately, it would be in Armenia's as well.
To many informed sources then, this is the challenge that faces the Armenian- American community in Washington in the years ahead.
