by Richard Giragosian
With an election for a new parliament set for May, Armenia is fast approaching another test of its commitment to democracy. The election has also triggered greater outside scrutiny of Armenian authorities' pledge to ensure that the contest is "free and fair."
But with a spotty record of almost all of its past elections tainted by some form of voting irregularities and violations, Armenia is now under much greater pressure for real electoral progress. A key question is whether Armenian authorities fully appreciate that this coming election represents something very different than the country's previous ballots.
Of course, the Armenian parliamentary election of May 12 is linked to the country's overall course of democratization and is, therefore, fundamentally linked to its evolving political development. In this way, the election is not in itself much different than earlier contests. And the May election does suggest a degree of significant similarity with past elections, in terms of both the politics and the politicians now engaged in the political process.
But it is the current Armenian political context that distinguishes this election as a true test, and turning point for the country.
Will reforms bring reformation?
Specifically, this new political context is marked by three significant factors. First, Armenia has reached a new, decisive stage in its political development, following the introduction of serious structural reforms. These included a set of electoral reforms introduced in May 2005, followed by the adoption of a package of constitutional amendments in a national referendum in November of that same year.
The electoral changes, intended to address shortcomings in past elections, were formulated to follow recommendations by the Council of Europe. Most notably, these reforms include measures aimed at limiting the presidential power to appoint members of the electoral commissions and reducing opportunities for voter fraud by creating a new national database or registry of the country's eligible voters, and protecting the rights of electoral observer teams in polling stations.
The reforms also altered the electoral system itself, by increasing the number of parliamentary seats to be elected by party lists, or proportional system, from 75 to 90, and lowering the number of single-mandate seats elected by the majoritarian system from 56 to 41. These changes attempted to reduce electoral corruption, or the practice of "vote buying" in parliamentary elections.
But it was the November 2005 passage of amendments to the Armenian constitution that marked a key move to deepen institutionalized democracy in the country. The constitutional amendments most importantly altered the political structures by introducing greater balance in the distribution of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the Armenian government.
These structural changes included measures that curbed the power of the president to appoint the prime minister, imposed a new requirement that the mayor of Yerevan be indirectly elected by an elected municipal council rather than appointed by the president. The changes also replaced the presidential appointment of the Council of Justice, which serves as a supervisory and disciplinary body within the judiciary, with an election by members of the judiciary.
Additionally, access to the country's highest judicial body, the Armenian Constitutional Court, which interprets and enforces basic law and ensures the constitutionality of legislation, was broadened to provide ordinary citizens with the right to challenge the constitutionality of legal provisions applied against individuals. Prior to this change, access to the court and the right to challenge the constitutionality of policies or laws was limited to the president, a quorum of at least one-third of the parliament, and officially registered candidates running in elections.
As a clear step forward in the development of Armenian democracy, the adoption of these electoral and constitutional reforms actually demonstrates the need for Armenia to be held to an even higher standard-with the implementation, and not just the introduction, of these democratic reforms serving as the crucial next stage. The imperative now rests not just on the scale and scope of the reforms, but on how the Armenian government responds to the necessity of following this higher standard.
May 12 will be Armenia's first test to prove whether these internationally imposed reforms are simply window dressing.
Rocky start to reform
Ironically, the Armenian constitutional referendum also represents the second factor in this new Armenian political context. In contrast to the positive structural changes resulting from the passage of the constitutional amendments, it was the actual voting in the referendum itself that contributed to such a new political context.
More specifically, the national referendum of November 27, 2005 was a blatant demonstration of the most serious shortcomings in Armenian politics. From the beginning, the referendum was marred by an obvious campaign by the Armenian authorities to secure the passage of its proposed constitutional amendments.
Armenia's opposition parties opposed the constitutional changes as too little and too limited, while the Armenian authorities, who saw the referendum on its draft proposals as a vote of confidence, especially as the last referendum in May 2003 failed due to the lack of participation by the required minimum number of voters.
Thus, a confrontation over the referendum was to be expected. But the government went too far by leveraging its state apparatus and using state resources to pressure voters, even using municipal officials to pressure teachers, lesser state officials and some civil servants to actively lobby for the passage of the referendum.
Additionally, authorities used state television and state-affiliated media to broadcast government-sponsored advertisements advocating passage of the referendum. At the same time, opposition parties were forced to pay for television and radio airtime to make their case against the referendum.
The most glaring episode in the referendum was seen in the official result. The government claimed that nearly two-thirds of the country's 1.5 million eligible voters participated, a contention in stark contrast to reports by media and observers of nearly empty polling stations.
Thus, both the general apathy of the average voter and the temptation of the authorities to pre-determine desired election results have contributed to this new context of Armenian politics. The lesson from the referendum for the ordinary Armenian only encouraged a general feeling of distrust of the authorities and tended to only further discredit any hope for real political change through the ballot.
Pressure to perform
The third element in this new Armenian political context stems from its timing. The May election comes as the first political test for Armenia since the country signed the "action plan" with the European Union (EU) as commitment to the new EU "European Neighborhood Policy." The significance of that timing became most apparent during the visit to Armenia by the European Union's Special Representative to the South Caucasus Peter Semneby in early March, when Armenian officials were openly warned that any problems with the election would be a "lost opportunity" for a "firm relationship" between Armenia and the EU.
And as the EU is also engaged in the region as a whole, Armenia's comparative advantage of political stability may soon dissipate in the face of another tainted election. Such a downturn for Armenia would only move the EU closer toward Azerbaijan, in an embrace already driven by Europe's desire for Caspian energy to offset its high dependence on energy imports from Russia. With Georgia already moving faster and closer to Europe on its own, this would also increase the isolation of Armenia.
The Armenian election is also the first of its kind since the country's inclusion in the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), a new U.S. foreign aid program that includes important new considerations and prerequisites for democracy and electoral performance. And despite the powerful influence of the Armenian Diaspora organizations over the annual adoption of U.S. foreign assistance in Congress, Armenia's position as a recipient of this MCA aid may be endangered by any setback in the coming election.
Such a suspension, or even cutoff, in the MCA aid program will also threaten the ambitious rural development strategy unveiled at the September 2006 Armenia-Diaspora conference. The rural poverty eradication program, a "pet" project of Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanian, is largely dependent on MCA funding in related areas of rural infrastructure, making the viability of the project dependent on the political performance of the election.
There is also a personal sense of dependence on the outcome of the election, as the country's most visible emissary to the Diaspora, Foreign Minister Oskanian, has emerged as the most vocal proponent of the necessity for an acceptable election. As Oskanian is also widely held as one of the few senior members of the Armenian government with no connection to corruption, both his integrity and visibility on this issue of elections may also foster a reaction from the Armenian Diaspora. Such a reaction may actually introduce a long overdue element of conditionality to Armenian politics, whereby the future role of the Diaspora in helping Armenia would include a prudent demand for greater democracy and less corruption.
Perhaps most importantly, the approaching Armenian election also comes amid a degree of international impatience over both Armenia's past failures in democracy and good governance, as well as from its present shortcomings in comparison with the recent achievements in both Georgia and Ukraine. Moreover, there is a sense of added impatience among several of Armenia's larger donor nations that are now reconsidering the results and returns of their years of financial assistance to Armenia.
In light of this new Armenian political context that distinguishes this election from others and that demonstrates that the country is facing a test with much higher expectations, the real issue is whether the Armenian authorities see that the threshold for their conduct is now significantly higher than before.
Tough talk
Recent public statements would suggest that the officials "get it."
President Robert Kocharian (January 3): "Free and fair conduct of the elections should be a priority for each of us."
Minister of Foreign Affairs Vardan Oskanian (February 15): "We failed in the previous elections and have no room [for another setback] now."
Serzh Sargsian (February 4), the new Prime Minister, and assumed presidential candidate: "I'll do my best to have the elections honest, free, fair and transparent."
Gagik Tsarukian, MP, and Armenia's most powerful oligarch (February 15): "There is no alternative to free and fair elections. Any other path would ruin Armenia's entire political stage."
Such language has created certain optimism that the May elections will be, finally, conducted in a way that doesn't embarrass the nation. Still, the core problem in Armenian politics is less about election fraud, and is rooted more in the closed nature of the country's political system.
This closed nature of politics and governance depends on the necessities for political patronage and public apathy, each of which condones the atmosphere of an "arrogance of power" and condemns the average Armenian citizen to a role more of a spectator than an actor in Armenia's political drama. This is demonstrated by a striking contrast between the activity and ambition of Armenian civil society and its inability to emerge as an effective agent of change capable of holding the government more accountable to higher standards of democracy.
It appears, then, that the May election will usher in a new stage in Armenian politics. And as this coming election is particularly significant, given the country's unique current political context, the outcome will not only form a new parliament but will undoubtedly determine much of the future for democracy and stability in Armenia.
The author consults for international agencies, including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and NATO. A former staff member of the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, Giragosian recently relocated to Yerevan, where he continues his work as a commentator for media, including Radio Free Europe, Jane's Information Group and ArmeniaNow.com internet journal.by Richard Giragosian
With an election for a new parliament set for May, Armenia is fast approaching another test of its commitment to democracy. The election has also triggered greater outside scrutiny of Armenian authorities' pledge to ensure that the contest is "free and fair."
But with a spotty record of almost all of its past elections tainted by some form of voting irregularities and violations, Armenia is now under much greater pressure for real electoral progress. A key question is whether Armenian authorities fully appreciate that this coming election represents something very different than the country's previous ballots.
Of course, the Armenian parliamentary election of May 12 is linked to the country's overall course of democratization and is, therefore, fundamentally linked to its evolving political development. In this way, the election is not in itself much different than earlier contests. And the May election does suggest a degree of significant similarity with past elections, in terms of both the politics and the politicians now engaged in the political process.
But it is the current Armenian political context that distinguishes this election as a true test, and turning point for the country.
Will reforms bring reformation?
Specifically, this new political context is marked by three significant factors. First, Armenia has reached a new, decisive stage in its political development, following the introduction of serious structural reforms. These included a set of electoral reforms introduced in May 2005, followed by the adoption of a package of constitutional amendments in a national referendum in November of that same year.
The electoral changes, intended to address shortcomings in past elections, were formulated to follow recommendations by the Council of Europe. Most notably, these reforms include measures aimed at limiting the presidential power to appoint members of the electoral commissions and reducing opportunities for voter fraud by creating a new national database or registry of the country's eligible voters, and protecting the rights of electoral observer teams in polling stations.
The reforms also altered the electoral system itself, by increasing the number of parliamentary seats to be elected by party lists, or proportional system, from 75 to 90, and lowering the number of single-mandate seats elected by the majoritarian system from 56 to 41. These changes attempted to reduce electoral corruption, or the practice of "vote buying" in parliamentary elections.
But it was the November 2005 passage of amendments to the Armenian constitution that marked a key move to deepen institutionalized democracy in the country. The constitutional amendments most importantly altered the political structures by introducing greater balance in the distribution of powers between the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the Armenian government.
These structural changes included measures that curbed the power of the president to appoint the prime minister, imposed a new requirement that the mayor of Yerevan be indirectly elected by an elected municipal council rather than appointed by the president. The changes also replaced the presidential appointment of the Council of Justice, which serves as a supervisory and disciplinary body within the judiciary, with an election by members of the judiciary.
Additionally, access to the country's highest judicial body, the Armenian Constitutional Court, which interprets and enforces basic law and ensures the constitutionality of legislation, was broadened to provide ordinary citizens with the right to challenge the constitutionality of legal provisions applied against individuals. Prior to this change, access to the court and the right to challenge the constitutionality of policies or laws was limited to the president, a quorum of at least one-third of the parliament, and officially registered candidates running in elections.
As a clear step forward in the development of Armenian democracy, the adoption of these electoral and constitutional reforms actually demonstrates the need for Armenia to be held to an even higher standard-with the implementation, and not just the introduction, of these democratic reforms serving as the crucial next stage. The imperative now rests not just on the scale and scope of the reforms, but on how the Armenian government responds to the necessity of following this higher standard.
May 12 will be Armenia's first test to prove whether these internationally imposed reforms are simply window dressing.
Rocky start to reform
Ironically, the Armenian constitutional referendum also represents the second factor in this new Armenian political context. In contrast to the positive structural changes resulting from the passage of the constitutional amendments, it was the actual voting in the referendum itself that contributed to such a new political context.
More specifically, the national referendum of November 27, 2005 was a blatant demonstration of the most serious shortcomings in Armenian politics. From the beginning, the referendum was marred by an obvious campaign by the Armenian authorities to secure the passage of its proposed constitutional amendments.
Armenia's opposition parties opposed the constitutional changes as too little and too limited, while the Armenian authorities, who saw the referendum on its draft proposals as a vote of confidence, especially as the last referendum in May 2003 failed due to the lack of participation by the required minimum number of voters.
Thus, a confrontation over the referendum was to be expected. But the government went too far by leveraging its state apparatus and using state resources to pressure voters, even using municipal officials to pressure teachers, lesser state officials and some civil servants to actively lobby for the passage of the referendum.
Additionally, authorities used state television and state-affiliated media to broadcast government-sponsored advertisements advocating passage of the referendum. At the same time, opposition parties were forced to pay for television and radio airtime to make their case against the referendum.
The most glaring episode in the referendum was seen in the official result. The government claimed that nearly two-thirds of the country's 1.5 million eligible voters participated, a contention in stark contrast to reports by media and observers of nearly empty polling stations.
Thus, both the general apathy of the average voter and the temptation of the authorities to pre-determine desired election results have contributed to this new context of Armenian politics. The lesson from the referendum for the ordinary Armenian only encouraged a general feeling of distrust of the authorities and tended to only further discredit any hope for real political change through the ballot.
Pressure to perform
The third element in this new Armenian political context stems from its timing. The May election comes as the first political test for Armenia since the country signed the "action plan" with the European Union (EU) as commitment to the new EU "European Neighborhood Policy." The significance of that timing became most apparent during the visit to Armenia by the European Union's Special Representative to the South Caucasus Peter Semneby in early March, when Armenian officials were openly warned that any problems with the election would be a "lost opportunity" for a "firm relationship" between Armenia and the EU.
And as the EU is also engaged in the region as a whole, Armenia's comparative advantage of political stability may soon dissipate in the face of another tainted election. Such a downturn for Armenia would only move the EU closer toward Azerbaijan, in an embrace already driven by Europe's desire for Caspian energy to offset its high dependence on energy imports from Russia. With Georgia already moving faster and closer to Europe on its own, this would also increase the isolation of Armenia.
The Armenian election is also the first of its kind since the country's inclusion in the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), a new U.S. foreign aid program that includes important new considerations and prerequisites for democracy and electoral performance. And despite the powerful influence of the Armenian Diaspora organizations over the annual adoption of U.S. foreign assistance in Congress, Armenia's position as a recipient of this MCA aid may be endangered by any setback in the coming election.
Such a suspension, or even cutoff, in the MCA aid program will also threaten the ambitious rural development strategy unveiled at the September 2006 Armenia-Diaspora conference. The rural poverty eradication program, a "pet" project of Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanian, is largely dependent on MCA funding in related areas of rural infrastructure, making the viability of the project dependent on the political performance of the election.
There is also a personal sense of dependence on the outcome of the election, as the country's most visible emissary to the Diaspora, Foreign Minister Oskanian, has emerged as the most vocal proponent of the necessity for an acceptable election. As Oskanian is also widely held as one of the few senior members of the Armenian government with no connection to corruption, both his integrity and visibility on this issue of elections may also foster a reaction from the Armenian Diaspora. Such a reaction may actually introduce a long overdue element of conditionality to Armenian politics, whereby the future role of the Diaspora in helping Armenia would include a prudent demand for greater democracy and less corruption.
Perhaps most importantly, the approaching Armenian election also comes amid a degree of international impatience over both Armenia's past failures in democracy and good governance, as well as from its present shortcomings in comparison with the recent achievements in both Georgia and Ukraine. Moreover, there is a sense of added impatience among several of Armenia's larger donor nations that are now reconsidering the results and returns of their years of financial assistance to Armenia.
In light of this new Armenian political context that distinguishes this election from others and that demonstrates that the country is facing a test with much higher expectations, the real issue is whether the Armenian authorities see that the threshold for their conduct is now significantly higher than before.
Tough talk
Recent public statements would suggest that the officials "get it."
President Robert Kocharian (January 3): "Free and fair conduct of the elections should be a priority for each of us."
Minister of Foreign Affairs Vardan Oskanian (February 15): "We failed in the previous elections and have no room [for another setback] now."
Serzh Sargsian (February 4), the new Prime Minister, and assumed presidential candidate: "I'll do my best to have the elections honest, free, fair and transparent."
Gagik Tsarukian, MP, and Armenia's most powerful oligarch (February 15): "There is no alternative to free and fair elections. Any other path would ruin Armenia's entire political stage."
Such language has created certain optimism that the May elections will be, finally, conducted in a way that doesn't embarrass the nation. Still, the core problem in Armenian politics is less about election fraud, and is rooted more in the closed nature of the country's political system.
This closed nature of politics and governance depends on the necessities for political patronage and public apathy, each of which condones the atmosphere of an "arrogance of power" and condemns the average Armenian citizen to a role more of a spectator than an actor in Armenia's political drama. This is demonstrated by a striking contrast between the activity and ambition of Armenian civil society and its inability to emerge as an effective agent of change capable of holding the government more accountable to higher standards of democracy.
It appears, then, that the May election will usher in a new stage in Armenian politics. And as this coming election is particularly significant, given the country's unique current political context, the outcome will not only form a new parliament but will undoubtedly determine much of the future for democracy and stability in Armenia.
The author consults for international agencies, including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and NATO. A former staff member of the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, Giragosian recently relocated to Yerevan, where he continues his work as a commentator for media, including Radio Free Europe, Jane's Information Group and ArmeniaNow.com internet journal.
